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Available online 20 April 2017Previous research suggests that there is an inverted U-shape curve for energy intensity in the long-run forWest-
ern Europewith a peak in the early 20th century. This paper tests the hypothesis that the increase of German and
British energy intensity was an effect from the concentration of heavy industrial production to these countries,
although the consumption of a signiﬁcant share of these goods took place elsewhere. We use an entirely new da-
tabase that we have constructed (TEG: Trade, Energy, Growth) to test whether these countries exported more
energy-demanding goods than they imported, thus providing other countries with means to industrialize and
to consume cheap-energy demanding goods.
We ﬁnd that the U-shape curve is greatly diminished but does not disappear. The pronounced inverted U-curve
in German energy intensity without trade adjustments is reduced when we account for energy embodied in the
traded commodities. For Britain the shape of the curve is alsoﬂattened during the secondhalf of the 19th century,
before falling from WWI onwards. These consumption-based accounts are strongly inﬂuenced by the trade in
metal goods and fuels, facilitating industrialization elsewhere.
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Unbalanced exchange1. Introduction
Today, China is often perceived as the workshop of the world, pro-
ducing large amounts of cheap consumer goods for others. A century
ago Britain andGermany (alongwith theUnited States) played a similar
role both for Europe and globally. In these ‘workshops of the world’ en-
ergy and other resources are used to produce goods to satisfy foreign
demand. This means that national levels of energy consumption may
look profoundly differentwhen international trade is taken into account
and energy use is attributed to the ﬁnal consumer, rather than producer
of a good: the so-called consumption based approach (Davis and
Caldeira, 2010), or ecological footprint approach (Wackernagel and
Rees, 1996). Calculating consumption-based environmental impact
has become popular but only covers recent decades. Often the con-
sumption-based approach focuses on the patterns and levels of con-
sumption of individuals.
However, from a national perspective ‘consumption’ is deﬁned as
production minus exports plus imports. Often contemporary consump-
tion-based studies draw the conclusion that the developed world is
outsourcing energy intensive and environmentally damaging production
abroad (Peters et al., 2011). However this can be questioned. Some of
what appears to be the displacement of emissions from the developed. This is an open access article underto the less developed countries is an illusion, caused by trade between
nations with energy systems of differing levels of carbon intensity, and/
or levels of energy efﬁciency. An improvement in energy efﬁciency in a
developed nation, for example, could appear to be a relative ‘outsourcing’
of environmental damage to a developing nation without any actual al-
teration in trade. Yet this is hardly outsourcing as commonly understood
(Jakob andMarschinski, 2012; Kander et al., 2015). Furthermore, if earli-
er growth in consumption levels across much of the world depended on
high levels of consumption of energy by the historical ‘workshops’, this
argument is reversed for the past: Britain and Germany were providing
the rest of the world economywith cheap coal and steel, while suffering
pollution and resource depletion.
The main objective of our paper is to understand the nature of na-
tions' energy needs over different phases of their historical development.
Themeans for achieving this objective is to explore if, and how, the ener-
gy intensity curves for-7 European countries change from 1870 onwards
when measuring energy use from the trade-adjusted consumption side,
instead of attributing energy use solely to the point of combustion.
A standard way to measure the relationship between economic de-
velopment and energy use is through energy intensity (EI), the amount
of energy required to produce a unit of GDP. It has been argued that ma-
terial resource use and pollution both increase, at least in relative terms,
i.e. in relation toGDP, during industrialization and decline as the nations
mature into service-oriented countries (Panayotou, 1993). This argu-
ment is formalised as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Itthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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fore they can get better. Another implication drawn from this argument
is that economic growth tends to solve its own environmental prob-
lems, at least in relative terms. The economy becomes less demanding
of natural resources and less polluting in relation to the value of output
it creates. In reality the interrelations of the economy and the environ-
ment are more complex. As demonstrated in a World Bank Report of
1992, while certain environmental damages tend to gradually diminish
over time as incomes rise, such as smoke pollution, others show contin-
uous increases, such as the volume of garbage. Other impacts are not
easilymeasured, such as biodiversity or ecosystem quality. An addition-
al problem is that some authors have mistaken relative decoupling of
environmental impact and GDP with absolute decoupling (Radetzki,
1990) and erroneously drawn the conclusion that if the pollution per
unit of GDP goes down, then the environment is less pressured overall.
This is of course not true: if the scale of the economy grows faster than
the rate of delinkage of energy consumption and growth, then absolute
environmental pressure will increase. The lion's share of EKC studies
deal with absolute environmental pressure or emissions in relation to
income levels, but there are some examples where pollution intensity
is addressed instead (Sun, 1999; Tan et al., 2015). One can therefore dis-
tinguish between a weak and strong hypothesis for the EKC, where the
weak hypothesis only suggests that pollution intensity resembles an
inverted U (Blackwood, 2002:124–126).
Reddy and Goldemberg (1990) proposed the idea of a similar
inverted-U curve for energy intensity, although its is important to note
that this is not identical with the EKC even in the case of the weak hy-
pothesis (pollution intensity), as different energy carriers pollute to a
very different degree (compare windpower with coal, for example).1
The existence of such a curve for energy intensity with the same
shape for all countries, only differing in the timing and level of the
peak, would suggest a universal pattern of industrialization, even though
latecomers can learn frompioneers and by the use ofmore efﬁcient tech-
nologies and peak at a lower level. Such a model suggests that all coun-
tries go through a period of increasing energy intensity as they
industrialize. Previous research has not entirely conﬁrmed this picture.
Our earlier research has demonstrated that the inverted-U curve does
not hold for a number of European countries, where energy intensity ac-
tually falls over the long period 1800 until today, if we include both tra-
ditional and modern energy carriers in the picture (Gales et al., 2007;
Kander, 2002). In these studies imports of coal and other fossil fuels are
included in national energy consumption, and direct exports of such
fuels (such as coal from England and Germany) are deducted from
their energy consumption. However, the embodied energy in goods con-
sumed elsewhere is not adjusted for in these calculations. It was found
that the inverted U-curve of energy intensity holds for the UK and Ger-
many, and their share of total European GDP and energy consumption
was so large that the whole continent's energy intensity also followed
an inverted U-shape (Kander et al., 2013).
In this article we critically revisit the inverted U-curve for energy
consumption. Could it even be the case that there was no such curve
for Europe when energy embodied in international trade is taken into
account, that is, when we employ a consumption-based measure?
This would indicate that the inverted U-curve is not associated with ris-
ing incomes and a stage of development per se, but the concentration of
energy intensive activity in particular countries or regions. Perhaps Ger-
many and Britain were exporting somuch energy embodied in goods in
the 19th century to countries outside the continent that European ener-
gy intensity, from a consumption perspective, may have been stable or1 Due to the non-proportional relationship between energy and environmental pres-
sure as some energy carriers are polluting and others are not, and due to the possible con-
fusions between the weak and strong EKC hypothesis, we refrain from the use of the EKC
concept entirely, when we speak about energy intensity and instead use “the inverted U-
curve.” The ideas that structural change (industrialization, service transition) explains the
shape of the curve are however the same for both EKC and energy intensity.even fallen during industrialization? This is not entirely improbable.
The period 1800–1913 saw a rapid expansion in world trade: from 3%
to 33% of world production. Europe made up 62% of world trade in
1913 and mainly exported manufactured goods and imported primary
goods (Kenwood and Lougheed, 1992). Manufacturing exports were
dominated by the UK (which sold 70% of its exports to non-European
countries in 1913) and Germany (selling 34% of their exports outside
Europe) (Svennilson, 1954). We will examine whether the inverted U-
curve for energy intensity ceases to exist for Britain and Germany
(and thus for Europe) when their international trade is accounted for.
Equally, will we ﬁnd countrieswhose energy consumption appears con-
siderably higher once imported goods are brought into the picture? Our
analysis covers seven countries: the UK, Germany, the Czech lands, Den-
mark, Sweden, Italy and Portugal, over the time period 1870–1935.
Section 2 of the article discusses previous research on long-term en-
ergy intensity, where this has not been adjusted for energy embodied in
traded goods. Section 3 describes the new dataset that we have con-
structed, and how it relates to similar approaches by other researchers.
We also provide amore extensive document of supplementary informa-
tion (SI) alongside this paper, describing in far more detail the methods
employed and results obtained, in particular on how the energy embod-
ied in particular traded commodities has been calculated. Section 4 pre-
sents the overall results for our set of countries, ﬁrstly on energy
embodied in traded commodities, both imports and exports, and second-
ly on how energy intensity changes after trade-adjustment. The discus-
sion in Section 5 evaluates the implications of our results for the wider
understanding of long run energy history.
2. Previous Research on Long Term Energy Intensity
Previouswork has already demonstrated that Reddy andGoldemberg
(1990) overestimated the upwards slope of energy intensity during in-
dustrialization because they did not include traditional energy carriers
such as wood and draft animal power. Initial levels of energy consump-
tion were much higher than they appreciated. European countries that
did not have access to large domestic deposits of coal, such as Sweden,
the Netherlands, Italy and Spain, all showed either a slowly or even dras-
tically declining energy intensity curve over time (Gales et al., 2007).
Analyses of Canada and theUnited States have also showndrastically de-
clining energy intensity during the 19th century (Csereklyei et al., 2016;
Henriques and Borowiecki, 2017; Unger and Thistle, 2013). These results
disproved the existence of a uniform invertedU-shape curve for all coun-
tries. Nevertheless it remained the case that some countries endowed
with large deposits of domestic coal, primarily Britain and Germany, do
show increasing energy intensity during their industrialization (Kander
et al., 2013; Warde, 2007). In Britain's case this upward shift began
early, as coal became the dominant fuel during the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries (Malanima, 2016; Warde, 2007). Since they were such
large economies and took an increasing share of the continent's econom-
ic activity, their pattern affects the aggregate western European picture
which thus also becomes an inverted U-shape curve.
Fig. 1 presents both the aggregate curve of energy intensity since
1820 for the eight Western European countries that were covered by
our previous research, and a stylized inverted U-shape graph based on
this.
In this article for reasons of data availabilitywe use a different sample
of countries but the shape of the curve, still driven by Britain andGerma-
ny, is very similar (see Fig. 2).2 Although we have not been able to2 The advantage with using this sample throughout the rest of this paper is that we can
aggregate the national ﬁgures of energy embodied in imports and also aggregate the ener-
gy embodied in exports and get a grand total net balance for our combined set of countries.
We can then see howmuch it can alter the aggregate shape of the European energy inten-
sity curve for exactly this sample of countries. For this purpose we do not need to know
exactly how this trade was distributed between these countries (i.e. the precise ﬂows be-
tween each other); we only need to know what were the inﬂows and outﬂows for the
whole of our sample, as any intra-sample trade cancels out.
Fig. 1. Graph of European aggregate energy intensity, 1820–2009, MJ per constant international dollar, 1990 price level.
Source: Kander et al. (2013) based on 8 countries: Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden and Portugal.
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(Henriques and Borowiecki, 2017; Henriques and Sharp, 2016) and the
Czech lands (Nielsen et al., 2016). Having access to data for the Czech
lands is especially interesting, since it is a coal-rich eastern European
country.
Fig. 3 shows the energy intensities of the same seven individual
countries included in the sample for the aggregate curve in Fig. 2 for
the critical period 1870 to 1935, when the aggregate curve peaks and
begins to fall. We see that as well as Germany the Czech lands had an
inverted U-shaped curve for energy intensity, increasing from 1870.
Asmentioned above, Britain's energy intensity had already begun rising
prior to 1800, peaking in the 1870s. The other economies, without do-
mestic coal, had either ﬂat or decreasing energy intensity during the
period.
Energy intensity can change for various reasons; technical change,
structural change, and changes in energy quality. Changed patterns of in-
ternational trade may induce structural change. Structural change in
economiesmeans that the relative role played by different sectors in cre-
ating GDP varies over time. As nations industrialize their manufacturing
grows relatively faster than agriculture, for example. Sectors differ inFig. 2. Energy intensity of Britain, Germany, Czech lands, Denmark, Sweden, Italy and
Portugal 1800–2000, MJ per constant international dollar, 1990 price level. Source: our
construction with the data from Henriques (2011); Kander et al. (2013), Henriques and
Borowiecki (2017), Henriques and Sharp (2016), and Nielsen et al. (2016).their energy requirements; to take a simple example, it takesmore ener-
gy to produce $1000worth of steel than of pills. Technical or within-sec-
tor change in the efﬁciency of energy use will reduce overall energy
intensity, ceteris paribus. However if at the same time structural change
shifts the balance of economic activity towards more intense sectors,
then this countervailing force would still cause overall energy intensity
to rise. Thus even as the industrial sector improves its own technical
(within-sector) efﬁciency, its relative growth can push aggregate energy
intensity up. The relative roles of structural and technical change are very
important in the analysis of energy intensity, as has been found for stud-
ies of contemporary nations (Fujii and Managi, 2013; Mulder, 2015;
Voigt et al., 2014).
Energy quality distinguishes energy carriers according to the differ-
ential uses to which they can be put; electricity is much more versatile
than coal or draft animal power, for example. This can be analysed
through prices, which must to some degree reﬂect these differences
(Cleveland et al., 2000; Stern, 2010). Considering energy quality is espe-
cially relevant for the period when oil and electricity enter the scene on
large scale, i.e. in the second half of the 20th century in Europe.
Gentvilaite et al. (2015) explored the role of energy quality in shaping
long-term energy intensity for Britain and Sweden, based on national
energy retail prices. No relation was identiﬁed between energy quality
and energy intensity in the 19th century,while improved energy quality
may have stimulated declining energy intensity in Europe over the 20th
century.
Other potential sources of explanations for the drastic decline in en-
ergy intensity observed after 1970 are the effects of the oil crises in the
1970s,whichmayhave stimulated both technical change, and the struc-
tural effects of deindustrialization and transition towards a service
economy. While the service transition is largely a price illusion when
it comes to structural changes in the actual physical production of soci-
eties (as opposed to the distribution of the workforce), it has exercised
some inﬂuence on energy intensity change as shown by conventional
decomposition analysis (Ang and Zhang, 2000; Henriques and Kander,
2010; Kander, 2005). More generally recent work suggests that the
core innovations of the third industrial revolution (such as the micro-
processor) played a greater role for reducing both material and energy
intensities from the 1970s (Fischer-Kowalski and Amann, 2001;
Kander et al., 2013; Krausmann et al., 2009; Wiedenhofer et al., 2013).
Fig. 3. Individual country trends, energy intensity, (MJ/$1990), 1800–1935.
Sources: For Portugal: Henriques (2011), For Denmark: 1870–1913 Henriques and Sharp (2016), 1914–1935 Henriques and Borowiecki (2017). For the Czech lands, Nielsen et al. (2016).
For the other countries: Power to the People, Kander et al. (2013). Swedish energy intensity is revised from the book ‘Power to the People’ as new research has shown that ﬁrewood use for
charcoaling in the iron industry was substantially higher than assumed in previous estimates by Schön (1992).
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via structural change. If a country specializes in heavy industrial goods
for export it is likely to have a high energy intensity. If part of the decline
in energy intensity in Europe after 1970 was due to the displacement of
emissions to less developed parts of the world through trade, this may
be amatter of moving the resource and environmental problems rather
than solving them. For the period of industrialization in Europe during
the 19th century, decomposition analysis clearly demonstrates that in-
creasing energy intensity was driven by structural changewith industry
gradually taking up a larger fraction of GDP in at least the UK and Swe-
den, countries wherewe have established sectoral energy intensity data
(Kander et al., 2013, Appendix B). Thiswas almost certainly true for Ger-
many as well. This paper addresses whether part of this structural
change was due to international trade.4 For the Czech lands, all data prior to WWII refer to Czech lands only, thus the geo-
graphical areawhichmore or less corresponds to the current territory of the Czech Repub-
lic. Within the period of 1870–1913, the Czech lands were a part of larger entity – the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. For the period after WWII, the geographical scope includes
the newly created republic of Czechoslovakia, thus both the Czech and Slovak Republic.
German data refers towhatwere its current borders at the time, as some territorywas lost
after 1919. British data refers only to Great Britain and does not include Ireland, although
the Irish Free State was part of the UK before 1921 and Northern Ireland remained in the
UK throughout the period.
5 Food for humans was not included, since this is not done in contemporary consump-
tion-based acccounts. It would require a full account of labor time used in different pro-
duction processes as well as estimates of how large share of a worker's food that was
consumed while he was working. Moreover rough calculations we have made including
the labor force make it clear that it would comprise a very small share of the energy em-
bodied in traded goods.
63. Methods and Data
This work relies on a newdatabase, TEG (Trade, Energy and Growth),
whichwill be linked to the LEG (Long-run Energy andGrowth) database
previously published online (used in Kander et al., 2013; see www.
energyhistory.org).3 LEG is constructed from a conventional ‘production’
perspective, that accounts for the energy used within national borders
(and thus includes imports and exports of energy carriers such as coal
and oil, but no embodied energy). TEG provides a consumption-based
account of energy instead, and contains information about quantities of
exported and imported goods for all our countries where these are rele-
vant for an energy analysis; the amount of embodied energy in these
traded goods; and the net result of embodied energy ﬂows. This allows
the calculation of consumption-based energy account and we include
in this study the benchmark years ca 1870, 1913 and 1935. Data is3 This covered Germany, Great Britain (Warde, 2007), Sweden (Kander, 2002), France,
Portugal (Henriques, 2009, 2011), Italy (Malanima, 2006), Spain (Gales et al., 2007) and
the Netherlands (Gales et al., 2007).provided for Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, Portugal, Italy, Denmark
and the Czech lands.4
Energy sources included are primary energy carriers, both tradition-
al and modern. Traditional energy sources are ﬁrewood, feed for draft
animals, and direct working water and wind (the latter being very
small shares of the total).5 Modern carriers include fossil fuels (coal,
oil and later natural gas), and electricity produced from sources other
than fossil fuels: hydro, nuclear, wind, solar etc.6
Our approach has much in common with studies of material ﬂows,
and industrial and social metabolism (Ayres and Simonis, 1994; Cussó
et al., 2006; Fischer-Kowalski and Hüttler, 1998; González de Molina
and Toledo, 2014; Haberl et al., 2001; Krausmann et al., 2009; Kuskova
et al., 2008). All are interested in the interaction of human societies
and their environmental and ecological context over time, and especial-
ly the transformations brought by industrialization and globalization.
Such approaches have sought to develop an understanding of such rela-
tionships and changes through the mapping of quantitiative ﬂows ofWe do not quality-adjust the energy on basis of prices, and nor do studies of Energy
Intensity or embodied energy in general. Of course different carriers do have varied qual-
ities, although themost distinctive, oil and especially electricity, did not have verywideus-
age during this period. Coal, having a higher energy density, was better for transportation
than ﬁrewood, but in many regards they are not dissilimar.
7 A difference between the method of process analysis that we follow here and that of
some contemporary input-output methods is that we only capture the direct energy used
in different process steps. This means that while contemporary consumption based ac-
counts try to apportion energy used for commercial transportation to the different rele-
vant sectors, we do not. This would be desirable in a complete accounting but current
data availability does not permit this.
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terial and energy needs for particular phases of development have been
and how they have beenmet. However, ourmethod differs in important
ways. In calculating energy embodied in traded goods we do not only
count direct energy used in the ﬁnal stage of production, but also indi-
rect energy used in earlier stages of production to extract andmanufac-
ture themain inputs into the ﬁnal commodity. This is amajor difference
between ourmethod and previous physical balance of trade (PBT) anal-
yses applied to historical data, such as Krausmann (2015) or Schandl
and Schulz (2002). Our approach is in this respectmore similar to ener-
gy accounts introduced by Odum (1995) (Hau and Bakshi, 2004), but
differs in that we do our calculations in terms of fuel equvialents, rather
than equivalents of solar energy, and we draw narrower boundaries
around the production system. Our focus on energy as a strategic re-
source, following the chain of production of goods and all related energy
inputs through a detailed process analysis means that we can thus trace
not only the direct exchange of fossil fuels and strategic resources like
steel and cotton, but also the “hidden” or embodied ﬂows of energy.
More localised studies have provided such historical information for
some agricultural commodities (Aguilera et al., 2015; Tello et al.,
2016) we provide estimates for national trade as a whole. We view all
these different approaches as complementary in seeking to understand
the intertwined story of social metabolism of societies and their energy
histories; but it is important to recognise that different studies do not
measure precisely the same things.
The ecological footprint approach (Wackernagel et al., 2004;
Wackernagel and Rees, 1996) is also closely related to studies of so-
cial metabolism. It translates all feasible environmental impacts into
land equivalents, and by including embodied land in products, brid-
ges over to the contemporary studies of embodied energy and car-
bon emissions, called the carbon footprint or consumption-based
carbon accounting. This form of consumption-based accounting is
conducted on basis of large world wide input-output databases
from the 1990s onwards, tracing the energy and carbon emissions
upstreams in the global value chains of production. However this
has not been attempted for earlier periods (Lenzen et al., 2012;
Peters et al., 2011; Wiedmann et al., 2015).
In the Supplementary information (SI) to this article we lay out in
detail our methods and provide the sources of information for the indi-
vidual countries and products. The basic methodwe use to trace energy
embodied in goods is process analysis (Bullard et al., 1978), and the re-
lationship of our method to process analysis and the more well-known
life-cycle analysis is also set out in the supplementarymaterial. The con-
straints of historical datameans that energy inputs into production have
to be reconstructed step by step froma range of sources, butwith exten-
sive use of industrial censuses. As explained in the SI, we do not include
the energy required to produce capital goods (e.g. machinery) used for
the productive processes we examine, although the production of new
machinery is included. The scale of this task means goods covered
have been limited to those estimated to require energy inputs of a
signﬁcant scale in traded goods (some goods may be relatively energy
intensive but are not traded internationally, such as bricks). For exam-
ples of how technical coefﬁcents andmultipliers are constructed for cer-
tain key products, please see the SI.
In applying process analysis to historical data, we establish themain
steps in the production of a ﬁnal good and add energy consumption ﬁg-
ures at each step to produce an aggregate total. In process analysis this
total is called the multiplier, that is the amount by which a basic unit
of the good should bemultiplied to reach the ﬁgure for embodied ener-
gy. Our calculations use a multiplier of GJ per ton. For instance the pro-
duction of simple iron and steel goods contains three main steps: 1)
mining ore 2) reducing the oxygen of the ore and reﬁning it into pig
iron 3) smelting and working the metal into ﬁnal products. Steps 2
and 3 are the most energy consuming and have the highest energy re-
quirements (energy needed to produce one ton of output). The energy
used in the ﬁnal step in the production is called the direct energyrequirement, while the energy used in producing inputs into the ﬁnal
step in production is called the indirect energy requirements. Themulti-
plier is the sum of the indirect and direct requirements per unit of ﬁnal
output. The different steps also producewaste, aswell as by-products to
which, in certain circumstances, energy inputs should be allocated. A
ton of ﬁnal good may require more or less than a ton of each input
(for example, one ton of cotton goods required 1.08 tons of raw cotton
because of wastage in production). Thus the indirect energy require-
ment for each ton of input into a ﬁnal good must be adjusted to reﬂect
this using a ratio of input weight to the weight of ﬁnal product called
the technical coefﬁcient, raw cotton having a coefﬁcient of 1.08.
Creating the TEG database requires three steps.
3.1. Energy Requirements and Multipliers
Firstly we must ﬁnd information on the energy required to produce
goods, that is, to establish all of the indirect and direct energy require-
ments that allow calculation of the multiplier for each ton of traded
product. The limiting factor is detailed data on energy use. In contrast,
trade statistics are the most widely available historical statistics, often
with very detailed annual data for both imports and exports. Logically
this implies that the system for identifying homogeneous product
groups for which multipliers can be established must be driven by the
available energy data rather than the trade statistics.
Information on energy inputs into production differs signiﬁcantly
over time and between different products. In some countries like Swe-
den industrial statistics provide annual data from 1911 onwards with
information about energy use for all the subsectors of manufacturing.7
In other cases benchmark industrial censuses exist (e.g. the Census of
Production beginning in 1907 in Britain; In Germany the ﬁrst complete
industrial census was in 1936, with more limited censuses from 1875).
In the 19th century data is less easily available, but the industrial struc-
ture was also relatively simpler with fewer products and large groups
with relatively homogeneous characteristics. Even in the absence of for-
mal industrial censuses, there are occasional comprehensive surveys of
fuel consumption in sectors of industry and/or the employment of
steam power (such as the Royal Commission on Coal of 1870 in the
UK (HMSO- Her Majesty's Stationery Ofﬁce, 1871), or the Inquérito In-
dustrial de 1881 in Portugal (MOPCI-Ministério das Obras Públicas,
Comércio e Indústria, 1881)).
The multipliers have been constructed for benchmark dates (ca.
1870, 1913 and 1935). As detailed in the SI, we have country-speciﬁc
multipliers for most goods, but where data is lacking we assume con-
stant energy efﬁciency across countries in identical traded goods as a
most plausible assumption (and one widely employed in modern stud-
ies). In most countries this effects only a very small proportion or none
of our data. In Germany and Italy technical efﬁciencies could not be
established for a much larger proportion of goods. Where necessary
we assume the same production technologies for an appropriate com-
parator, equating for example coal-rich Germany and Britain.
3.2. Calculating Energy Embodied in Trade
The next step is to apply the multipliers to the trade statistics and
calculate the embodied energy ﬂows in international trade. We have
used national trade statistics for each country.We have avoided curren-
cy problems by always using the trade statistics expressed in tons rather
than monetary values. Thus we adjust the energy ﬂows embodied in
trade based on the physical quantities of traded commodities and the
38 A. Kander et al. / Ecological Economics 139 (2017) 33–44respective energy demands in their production.8 To use the physical
quantities of traded goods, rather than the values, is fairly unproblemat-
ic for this early period. The bulk of traded goods in this period were rel-
atively standard commodities such as iron, grain or cotton, but this
method becomes more troublesome for more complex goods like ma-
chinery and vehicles. Where weight was not reported we had to make
assumptions about the average relation between weight and value,
based on sources described in the SI. It is important to note explicitly
that our data does take into account imported goods that were used as
inputs for domestic processes for the production of goods then
exported. In this early stage of global trade these kinds of trade ﬂows
were not as signiﬁcant as they are today, but mattered in for example
the case of raw cotton imported into Britain that was used to produce
British textiles for export.
3.3. Adjusting Energy Intensity
In the last step we use the net value of energy embodied in trade
(NEE). This is written according to the conventions of trade analysis:
NEE ¼ Exported energy−Imported energy:
This value is then inserted into the following equation:
CBA ¼ PBA− NEEð Þ
used to calculate energy with a consumption-based approach (CBA) by
adjusting the Production Based Approach (PBA). Thus if imports are
larger than exports, the subtraction of a negative value of the NEE will
make the CBA larger than the PBA, while in the reverse case of exports
exceeding imports, this will give a positive value of the NEE, making
the CBA smaller than the PBA. The adjusted CBA is then used to calculate
a new consumption-based energy intensity for each country and the ag-
gregate sample.
Obviously there is a direct link between the amounts of energy con-
sumedwithin the borders of a nation, and the same nation's GDP. Ener-
gy has been used to fuel the furnaces and engines of that nation in a very
direct sense. Energy used in production and services increased GDP.
When we establish energy intensity from the consumption-based per-
spective instead we lose some of that straightforward connection.
Some of the energy used within a country's borders is for producing ex-
ports, which contribute to the national income.When we adjust for en-
ergy ﬂows embodied in both imports and exports there is no longer the
direct logical link to national income. Strictly speaking the monetary
ﬂows must still balance, in that the income spent on imports must bal-
ance that earned by exports, net of capital transfers. But the implicit as-
sumption behind a consumption-based energy intensity is that income
per capita would not be much affected by the composition of exports, a
counterfactual scenario that is very difﬁcult to assess. Nevertheless we
regard the adjusted energy intensity as an interesting indicator of the
energy demands of consumption at particular income levels, and one
less inﬂuenced by the vagaries of local resource endowments and inter-
national specialization. Furthermore, we are interested in how con-
sumption-based energy intensity changes during industrialization,
rather than its level in relation to production-based energy intensity,
and for that purpose our approach helps understand the effect from
trade on energy demand and intensity.8 Unlike input-output analyses that rely on calculating embodied energyusing the value
of trade, we use purely physical indicators, so export prices are not part of our calculations
and therefore do not affect the results. Of course export incomes are part of GDP and the
denominator of energy intensity irrespective of whether this is measured from the pro-
duction or consumption side.4. Results
4.1. Energy Embodied in the Traded Goods
The goods that mattered most for energy embodied in trade differ
among our countries and between dates. Fig. 4 shows the composition
of net embodied energy in trade for the major product groups in three
benchmark years – 1870, 1913 (1907 for the Great Britain) and 1935.
We provide corresponding more detailed tables for all countries in the
SIwith full export and import accounts. Fig. 4 shows theﬁnal net energy
balance for major commodities only.
As seen in Fig. 4, Britain was a large net-exporter of capital goods,
like iron and steel, throughout the period 1870–1935. It was also a sig-
niﬁcant net-exporter of cotton textiles and importer of raw cotton
around 1870, and in 1907, but in 1935 the importance of raw cotton im-
ports had dwindled, although textile exports were still signiﬁcant. Ener-
gy embodied in grain imports (mainly fodder for the draft animals used
to grow the grain) steadily rose over time. Britain exported large
amounts of coal and coke. While the amount of energy embodied in
the export of fuels (i.e. consumed in mining and coke production) was
obviously only a fraction of its entire energy content, its embodied ener-
gy alone was still signiﬁcant enough to make them the third ranked
commodity group for embodied energy in 1907, and ﬁfth in 1935.
It is important to note that we do not include the direct energy con-
tent in coal and coke that will be burned elsewhere as part of embodied
energy, but for comparative purposes we report on the actual magni-
tude of the direct energy of fossil fuels with a separate mark in the
graphs in Fig. 4 for all countries (white dot titled ‘net fossils’). This com-
parison provides an interesting perspective on the amount of embodied
energy and direct energy content of traded fossil fuels. In 1870, for ex-
ample, the net direct energy content of British coal exportswas dwarfed
by the magnitude of the embodied energy in the exported metals. By
1913, however, with the ongoing rise of fossil fuel exports from the
Great Britain, the energy balance shows a different picture.
Germany became a large net-exporter of heavy industrial capital
goods during the period studied with a peak in 1913. As Table 1 shows,
in in the early 1870s Germany was a net importer of embodied energy,
mainly iron and steel goods. By 1913, however, the country became a
major exporter of iron and steel, machinery and chemical products
while primarily importing agricultural goods.
Embodied energy in coal and coke (the energy used to extract and
produce those fuels), as in other coal-rich countries in our sample, also
made up a large fraction of exported embodied energy. Contrary to Brit-
ain, Germany never had substantial textile exports, but did have a large
chemical sector. Again, a full energy accounting of German trade would
have been much larger, since the direct energy content of coal and
coke exports are not included in the measure of embodied energy.
For the remaining countries the embodied energy in trade differed
substantially, both in terms of magnitude but also in the composition
of major traded goods. Both Sweden and the coal-rich Czech lands
were net exporters of embodied energy throughout the period of
study. Initially in Sweden a large share of embodied energy in exports
was concentrated into one sector – metals, but by the end of 1935,
paper and pulp became the largest product group. In the Czech lands,
on the other hand, the composition of energy embodied in goods was
far more fragmented among a variety of consumer goods, such as tex-
tiles, sugar and glass, but alsometals, which later became the largest ex-
port group.
Italy, Denmark and Portugal, on the other hand remained net im-
porters of embodied energy throughout the period of study. In all
three countries imports of coal, coke and steel productswere important,
while on the export side Italy had largest shares of embodied energy in
textile products and Denmark and Portugal in food products. In terms of
direct energy content of traded fossil fuels (net fossils), all countries
without domestic coal reserves (Italy, Portugal, Sweden and Denmark)
were clear net importers.
Fig. 4. Energy embodied in trade by major products, 1870–1935. Note: Positive values denote net exports and negative values are net imports. Values only include energy embodied in
traded goods but not the actual direct energy content of the traded goods. The white dot shows the actual energy content of the traded fossil fuels; positive values denotes net exports
of fossil fuels and negative values denotes net imports.
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Fig. 4 (continued).
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By aggregating the results for our whole sample we can study the
net-balance of energy embodied in trade for a group of signiﬁcant Euro-
pean countries, but not for western and central Europe as a whole. Ger-
many and the Czech lands were also exporters to countries further east
within Europe. The overall results are provided in Tables 1 and 2. The
main conclusion is that when energy embodied in trade is accounted
for, energy intensity changed substantially, not only for individual coun-
tries but also for our whole sample.
The inverted U-curve of German energy intensity becamemuch less
pronounced after trade adjustment. This was not only due to internal
ﬂows of embodied energy within our sample, as aggregate curve also
becomes ﬂatter over the late 19th and early 20th century. It goes up a
small amount (13%) between 1870 and 1913. For Britain the curve be-
comes ﬂat right across the second half of the 19th century.
One might hypothesize that some of the non-coal economies that
did not have any inverted U-shape curve from the production-based ac-
count might have one with the consumption-based method. But as
Table 1 clearly demonstrates this did not happen. The main net-ﬂows
of energy were not between the countries of our sample. Instead there
was a net outﬂow of energy to other parts of the world.4.3. German, British and Czech Trade Patterns
In the late 19th century, only Britain had a large amount of trade
with non-European countries (in monetary values), about half of its
total. The USA and India were the main non-European trading partners
for the UK, with Canada, Argentina, Australia and Russia making up
about 5% each. In the period of our analysis Germany and the Czech
lands are the most interesting cases from an energy intensity point of
view, because after 1870 they are the only countries driving the curve
of energy intensity up. As we have seen, in Germany's case this had a
clear inverted-U form before adjustment for trade, and it moved frombeing a net-importer of embodied energy in 1870 to a net-exporter by
1913. Thus at least part of the increase in national energy consumption
to 1913 must have been satisfying consumers in other countries.
We have seen the drastic change in Germany's energy intensity
curve when adjusted for trade. The country mainly responsible for the
inverted U-shaped curve of energy intensity at a European level in this
period had a much smaller rise in energy intensity when viewed from
the consumption side. Even though aggregate intensity might rise by
Germany cornering a larger share of continental output this effect was
not large enough in our sample to offset the reduction from accounting
for energy embodied in trade.
It thus becomes of particular interest to identify Germany's trading
partners. If their energy embodied in exported goods largely left Europe,
we could conclude that intercontinental tradewas themain factor driv-
ing up the non-adjusted curve for the continent. However, Germany's
main trading partners were Austria-Hungary, France, Russia and the
UK. Unlike Britain, its trade was not orientated outside the continent.
Of these countries France is not in our sample and Austria-Hungary is
only partially covered (the Czech lands being part of it). In sheer eco-
nomic (value) terms Germany always had a favourable balance of
trade in relation to the UK, but a negative balance in relation to their
main non-European trading partners, the USA and Russia. Germany's
exports of goods with a large share of embodied energy, such as iron
and steel, and coal and coke, were also mostly to European neighbours,
as shown in Table 3. Substantial amounts went to countries outside of
our sample, such as France, Belgium and the Netherlands.
The Czech lands also represent an interesting case, although the
share of their trade within the sample is small relative to Britain and
Germany. Before the establishment of Czechoslovakia in 1918, the
Czech landswere part of theAustro-HungarianMonarchy. Austria-Hun-
gary was to a large extent a “self-sufﬁcient economic entity” (Matis,
1994). The composition of goods in Czechoslovak foreign trade was rel-
atively stable throughout the period of study, with imports dominated
by raw materials and commodities, while consumer and industrial
goods formed the largest share of exports. In the early stages of the
Table 1
Production based (PB) energy, consumption based (CB) energy and PB energy intensity
(PB E/Y) and CB energy intensity (CB E/Y) for all our seven countries and the aggregate
group.
1832 1849 c.1870 c.1913 1935
Energy, PB (PJ) 2842 5196 14,204 13,371
Denmark 34 44 124 200
Germany 481 1360a 6227 5381
Italy 326 353 688 883
Portugal 54 66 116 136
GB 979 1711 3004 6114 5738
Sweden 149 190 340 410
Czech 87 179 595 623
Energy, CB (PJ) 4760 12,403 12,963
Denmark 58 157 238
Germany 1503a 5252 5111
Italy 371 781 958
Portugal 71 139 151
GB 959 1535 2441 5311 5539
Sweden 157 311 393
Czech 86a 159 452 573
GDP (bn 1990 $) 240.1 587.7 770
Denmark 4.1 11.7 20.2
Germany 76.7a 237.3 275.5
Italy 43.5 96.9 137.4
Portugal 4.3 7.2 11.6
GB 35.9 54.2 93.3 191 262
Sweden 5.1 16.2 28.1
Czech 6.8a 12.6 27.4 34.8
PB E/Y (MJ/$) 21.7 24.0 17.0
Denmark 10.6 10.6 9.9
Germany 17.7 26.2 19.5
Italy 8.1 7.1 6.4
Portugal 15.2 16.1 11.8
GB 27 31.6 32.2 32.0 21.9
Sweden 33.9 22.2 14.9
Czech 12.8a 14.3 21.7 17.9
CB E/Y (MJ/$) 19.8 21.1 16.8
Denmark 14.1 13.5 11.8
Germany 19.6 22.1 18.6
Italy 8.5 8.1 7.0
Portugal 16.3 19.3 13.0
GB 26.4 28.1 26.1 27.8 21.1
Sweden 28.0 19.2 14.0
Czech 12.7 12.7 16.5 16.3
Note: PB and CB are both net of trade (Exports minus imports), but in the case of PB it is
only direct energy content of carriers like fossil fuels (coal and oil), and in the case of CB
it is also the net embodied energy in trade. Text in bold is total for seven countries. PJ
= 1015 J.
a Czech ‘1849’ data is for 1841. Danish data is for 1874. German data is for 1872.
Table 2
Production based (PB) energy intensity, and consumption based (CB) energy intensity, in-
dex 1870 = 100.
PB energy intensity
1832 1849 c.1870 c.1913 1935 Pattern
Denmark 100 100 93 No inverted U
Germany 100 148 110 Inverted U
Italy 100 88 79 No inverted U
Portugal 100 106 78 Tiny inverted U
GB 85 98 100 99 68 Long run inverted U, but
very ﬂat 1849–1913
Sweden 100 62 43 No inverted U
Czech 100 152 125 Inverted U
7 countries 100 112 80 Inverted U
CB energy intensity
Denmark 100 96 84 No inverted U
Germany 100 113 89 Shallow inverted U
Italy 100 95 82 No inverted U
Portugal 100 118 80 Inverted U
GB 101 107 100 107 81 No inverted U
Sweden 100 69 50 No inverted U
Czech 100 130 129 Upword slope then ﬂat
7 countries 100 107 85 Shallow inverted U
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accounted for the largest export share by value. In volume terms, the
Czech lands have historically been a major exporter of coal (brown
coal) and wood, most of which was destined for the current territory
of Austria. Exports going west from Czechoslovakia consisted mainly
of sugar, timber, glassware, wooden articles, paper and hops. Exports
eastwards from Czechoslovakia (including the territory of Austria)
were dominated by iron and steel, machinery, chemical products,
sugar, alcohol, textiles and footwear (Cisar and Pokorny, 1922). By
1913 the Czechoslovak territories were the most important trading re-
gion of the whole monarchy, and within it played a similar role to Ger-
many in a larger European context, or Britain in regard to a variety of
trading partners earlier in the 19th. By 1913 some 70% of total Czecho-
slovak production was destined for exports, mainly within the borders
of Austria-Hungary, with only some 30% estimated to be consumed
domestically.
4.4. Consumption-Based National Energy Accounts
National energy histories change substantially when viewed on a
consumption basis. Accounting for trade brings major adjustments to
levels as well as trends (see Table 4). However, unsurprisingly, theimpact is rather different in magnitude and direction. Measured by di-
viding embodied energy in trade by production-based national energy
consumption (where a positive sign indicates export of energy and a
negative sign import) embodied energy in trade varies between +24%
(Czech lands in 1913) and −31% (Denmark in 1870). Net exporters
are the coal-rich countries; Britain and the Czech lands, but also Swe-
den, rich in charcoal and iron ore. Coal-rich Germany is a very interest-
ing case; it moves from being a net-importer in 1870 (−11%) to a net–
exporter in 1913 (+16%) and continues to be a net-exporter in 1935
(+4%). Net importers are Denmark, Portugal and Italy. These are coun-
tries that lacked domestic coal resources, and were not well-endowed
with iron ore.
In all cases the net adjustment was smaller in 1935 than 1913,
reﬂecting the interwar era of protectionism and Depression. In Sweden,
Britain and Denmark the relative size of traded embodied energy de-
clined after 1870. In fact Sweden and Britain are surprisingly similar in
the ratios and trends of net-exported energy at the three benchmarks;
it seems the comparative advantages of energy-intensive production
fell for these two countries over time. This is not surprising given dra-
matically falling transportation costs, which helped equalize energy
costs internationally. Land-locked Germany came later to exploiting its
coal-advantages, with a peak share of embodied energy in exports in
1913.
In Portugal and the Czech lands the gap between consumption- and
production-based was largest in 1913 and declined thereafter, as vol-
umes of trade diminished. Portugal was a late industrializer, and late in
importing steel and coal and machinery, so this is expected. The Czech
lands could, to some degree, also be characterized as a late industrializer,
though the nature of the country's trade pattern and domestic produc-
tion changed substantially between 1870 and 1913. In fact, by the begin-
ning of WWI the territories of the Czech lands covered the needs of the
whole Austrio-Hungarian Monarchy, and at this point its pattern of
trade in 1913 thus resembled that of other industrialized countries, dom-
inated by imports of raw materials and exports of manufactured goods.
5. Conclusions
This study shows that applying the consumption-based approach
rather than the production-based account is relevant for analysing
Europe's intensive phase of industrialization, 1870–1935. The inverted
U-shape curve for energy intensity is greatly diminished for our set of
seven European countries when we account for energy embodied in
Table 3
Share of German exports of iron and steel goods, coal and coke to main trading partners, 1913.
Tons/country Pig iron (782,911) Cast iron (700,779) Iron goods (1,173,265) Coal (34,598,408) Coke (6,432,986)
UK 71% 22%
France 15% 9% 37%
Belgium 40% 10% 17% 15%
Netherlands 14% 21%
Austria-Hungary 14% 6% 35% 16%
Japan 8%
Argentina 8%
Russia 6% 8%
Switzerland 6%
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curve for the 19th century and then a declining curve from WWI on-
wards, with the rise between 1870 and 1913 falling by around two-
ﬁfths.
The results show that the coal-rich countries were making use of
their coal resources and specializing in heavy industrial production,
some of it for export to other European countries that lacked domestic
coal resources. The role of coal for specialization peaked before the
WWI and diminished thereafter. This is especially obvious in the case
of Germany that net-exported around 16% of national energy consump-
tion in embodied form before the War. This substantially affected the
energy intensity pattern for Germany and our set of seven countries.
Britain's proportional net-export of energy peaked at an early date,Table 4
Individual country patterns.
Imported
fossil fuels, PJ
Total national energy
consumption, minus food, PJ
Embodied in imports, PJ, (within
brackets; of which coal and coke)
Great Britain
1832 979 23
1849 1712 41
1870 0.85 3004 94
1907 31 6114 291
1935 322 5738 224
Germany
1872 105 1360 279 (7)
1913 271 6227 302 (15)
1935 201 5381 178 (24)
Czech Lands
1841 0 87 0.9
1870 0 179 8
1913 0a 596 20
1935 59b 623 34
Sweden
1870 12.5c 190 8 (0.8)
1913 173 340 57.5 (20.9)
1935 253 410 72 (36)
Denmark
1870 21 44 16 (1)
1913 98 124 60 (9)
1935 170 200 71 (18)
Portugal
1870 5.6 66 5.8 (0.3)
1913 37.2 116 27.5 (3.1)
1935 36.2 136 18.9 (1.7)
Italy
1870 34 353 28 (1,8)
1913 352 688 130 (19)
1935 516 883 112 (38)
a 89 exported.
b 70 exported.
c Of coal 12.3 PJ or (93%) was imported. All oil (0.2 PJ) was imported in 1870.around 1870, when 19% of energy consumption was embodied in ex-
ports, a similar level to China today (Tang et al., 2016).
However, Europe is larger than our set of seven countries, andmore
than half of Germany's export of heavy industrial goods went to other
European countries outside of our sample. Thus for the entirety of Eu-
ropé it is highly unlikely that the curve disappears, as Britain and Ger-
many were the main industrial producers.
These results shed new light on the historical relationship between
energy and GDP. The stylized fact of the inverted U-shape curve for en-
ergy intensity suggests that during an intense phase of industrialization,
energy use in relation to GDP, by necessity goes up. This is because of
structural change,with a growing share of industry in GDP, even if with-
in-sector energy intensity is falling. Previous research has shown thatEmbodied in
exports, PJ
Net national
energy
consumption
Net-exported energy
embodied in goods, PJ
Net
exports/national
energy, %
43 959 20 2%
218(5) 1535 177 10%
657(21) 2441 563 19%
1094(148) 5311 803 13%
423(73) 5539 199 3%
143 (11) 1503 −143 −11%
1278 (17) 5252 976 16%
448 (153) 5111 270 4%
1.8 86 0.95 1.1%
28 (1.1) 160 20 11%
163 (4.9) 452 142 24%
85 (6.9) 573 51 8.1%
41 157 33 17%
87 311 29.5 9%
89 393 17 4%
3 57 −13 −31%
24 158 −33 −27%
32 238 −38 −19%
0.7 71 −5.0 −8%
4.2 139 −23.3 −20%
4.4 151 −14.4 −11%
10 371 −18 −5%
36 781 −94 −14%
37 958 −75 −8%
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ﬂat or falling during industrialization (Gales et al., 2007).9 The current
study reinforces this revised view and suggests that a ﬂat or declining
energy intensity during industrialization is a normal feature, found
also in some coal-rich early industrializers, if counted net of energy em-
bodied in international trade. The higher incomes from industrialization
do not necessarily, or even normally, lead to higher energy intensity in a
consumption-based approach.
As coal was the dominant fuel in this period, these results suggest
that early industrializers bore a large domestic environmental burden
to the beneﬁt of later industrialisers and less coal-rich countries who
imported capital goods and fuel, both inside and outside Europe. Britain
and Germany and the Czech lands gave others themeans to industrialize
and develop, and suffered pollution and health problems as a conse-
quence (of course, it is well documented that their imports in turn may
have been associated with other problems). This complicates the way
we perceive the role of core and periphery in economic development.
This empirical result by no means overturns or reverses all earlier prop-
ositions but suggests the environmental, economic and social impact of
trade is a complex area. Such data also potentially speaks to ethical de-
bates on current responsibility of nations for historical fossil fuel emis-
sions. It is clear that production- and consumption-based approaches
will give different results, in the past as well as the present. The data
may also help shed light on different countries' roles in the world trade
system, particularly when we can reﬁne studies to examine trade and
embodied energy in particular kinds of goods (such as capital goods as-
sociatedwith phases of infrastructural development, aswell as consumer
goods). The results stress how important it is to analyse energy and
emissions embodied in international trade for assessing nations' perfor-
mance in complyingwith production-based emission targets in the pres-
ent and future, and by doing so actually reduce global carbon emissions
and pollution, rather than displacing them elsewhere in the world
system.
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